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Abstract 
The present work analyzes the interaction between antitrust policy and intellectual property 
protection, with particular reference to the cases of refusal to supply, when it concerns ideas or inventions 
protected by an IP right. For this purpose, the paper preliminarily discusses the governing principles of 
antitrust policy on abuse of dominance and refusal to deal, as they have been implemented in the decisions of 
the EU Competition Authority, and it presents the specific issues related to the implementation of antitrust 
policy in the innovative industries.  
Then, the paper examines in particular the Microsoft Europe Case, as decided by the European 
Commission in 2004, focusing on the issue of the interoperability between the operating systems for personal 
computers and the operating systems for work group servers. The theoretical model, developed as an 
extension of the framework proposed by Choi and Stefanadis (2001) to the case of refusal to deal, suggests 
an explanation of the case, alternative to the one adopted by the Commission, if not necessarily in the final 
outcome of the decision, at least in the analytical arguments and in the dynamics of the market structure.  In 
particular, we show that the refusal to supply the compatibility between the two complementary products 
was determined not only by the intention to leverage its dominant position to the adjacent market of server 
operating systems, but especially by the concern for keeping the monopoly on its core market, that is the one 
of PC operating system, given the future evolution of the software market, due to the diffusion of cloud 
computing.     
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1. Introduction
The present paper aims at analyzing the interaction between antitrust policy and intellectual 
property protection, in order to discuss the practice followed by the Antitrust Authorities in the 
cases regarding refusal to supply, especially when it concerns ideas or inventions protected by an IP 
right. In these situations, the legitimate right of the IP holder to exclusively exploit the invention 
may be limited by a compulsory licensing decision of the Competition Authority, if the required 
information cannot be available in another way and if the denial to share it may substantially 
eliminate competition. In fact, this refusal to deal may produce a foreclosure effect for the 
competitors who need that intellectual property content, as an essential facility in order to produce 
their goods or deliver their services.  
In general, the market interested by this foreclosure effect can be either a downstream 
market, when the refused facility is a required input for the production of a downstream product in a 
vertically structured industry, or an adjacent market, when the IP holder denies some information 
which are necessary for allowing the compatibility between complementary products. In particular, 
in this chapter we will focus on the latter issue: in fact, in order to examine the controversial 
relation between antitrust and intellectual property, we will consider a paradigmatic case, that is the 
Microsoft Europe Case, as decided by the European Commission in 2004, and more precisely we 
will study the issue of the interoperability between the operating systems for personal computers 
and the operating systems for servers.  
This analysis of the refusal to supply intellectual property, with particular attention to the 
Microsoft case, will be also useful to have an intuitive understanding of a broader policy issue, 
concerning the effects of antitrust policy on technological progress: i.e. how the decisions of a 
competition authority may affect the incentives of the existing firms for investments in innovation, 
especially when the leader is obliged to share its advanced technology with the competitors1. 
Indeed, a key argument often proposed by dominant firms before the Competition Authorities in 
order to justify the refusal to supply is that the disclosure of this information would restrict their 
intellectual property right and then would reduce the expected award for their innovation effort. As 
a consequence, according to this view, such decisions of the Antitrust Authorities about compulsory 
licensing would lessen the incentives for innovation in the future, both for the leader, and for the 
                                                
1 In fact, a compulsory licensing decision can be considered as a typical example of a policy aimed at 
increasing the degree of competition in the market: in fact, if the firms operating in a given market, thanks to such a 
decision of the Antitrust Authority, are entitled to share the same technology level or the same scientific knowledge 
elaborated by the leader, they can benefit from the same competitive conditions, so they engage a market competition 
based on prices, rather than on product qualities or technological features.   
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followers, given that nobody would be interested in investing in R&D, knowing that he could be 
required to reveal the results of this innovation activity to other undertakings.  
Then, as it is clear from this problem, in several situations we can observe a clear trade-off 
between the protection of intellectual property and the implementation of antitrust policy, 
particularly in the cases of abuse of dominance. The solution of this possible conflict is determined 
case by case by the Antitrust Authority, which takes the relevant decisions on the basis of some 
general guidelines, also supported by some legal jurisprudence. 
For this reason, it can be useful to consider the governing principles of antitrust policy on 
abuse of dominance and refusal to deal, as they have been implemented in the decisions of the 
Competition Authorities. To this end, we recall the general concept of the abuse of dominant 
position within the EU Competition Policy and we discuss the issues related to its implementation 
in the innovative industries. Then, we pay attention to the cases decided by the European 
Commission within the legal framework provided by art.82 TEC for the abuse of dominant position 
and we define the conditions under which a refusal to supply can be regarded as an abusive conduct 
for a dominant firm. On the basis of these premises, we analyze in particular the Microsoft Europe 
Case, by proposing an explanation of the case, alternative to the one adopted by the Commission, if 
not necessarily in the final outcome of the decision, at least in the analytical arguments and in the 
dynamics of the market structure.     
2. Antitrust Policy and Intellectual Property in the Cases of Abuse of Dominance
In principle, the problem about the interaction between antitrust policy and intellectual 
property protection could exist both for the analysis of the abuse of dominance and for the 
investigation of the collusive agreements. In fact, also collusive agreements can include some 
provisions about intellectual property, such as the arrangements regarding patent pooling or cross-
licensing2, and also these agreements can raise concerns for the antitrust policy if they produce 
some foreclosure effect for the firms not taking part in these arrangements3. Nevertheless, the 
investigation about the cooperative arrangements between IPR holders is usually conducted by the 
Antitrust Authorities according to a more lenient approach, either because specific exemptions for 
                                                
2 In particular, a patent pool is an agreement under which a group of patent holders exploits and licenses, as a 
bundle, all the patents the members hold; while a cross-license is an arrangement among two or more firms, where each 
of them is granted the right to use the technologies patented by the other parties. 
3 For example, the exclusion of a firm from a pooling agreement can have an anticompetitive effect if the 
excluded firm cannot effectively compete in the market for a given good, which requires the licensed technology, and if 
the participants collectively have market power in the relevant market. 
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technological transfer are provided by the antitrust laws, or because the analysis of these 
agreements sometimes shows the existence of some pro-competitive effects overcoming the anti-
competitive ones. So, at the end, the tension between antitrust policy and intellectual property 
protection assumes a special relevance in the cases concerning the abuse of dominant position4.  
The general rule on the abuse of dominant position is provided by the art. 82 of the Treaty of 
the European Union, whose first paragraph states that:  
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or 
in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far 
as it may affect trade between Member States.
The traditional analysis of the abuse of dominance in the EU Antitrust Policy requires two 
stages: firstly, the identification of a dominant position; secondly, the definition of the abusive 
conduct. Within this order, the second step is strictly consequential to the first one, because some 
conducts can be considered as abusive only if they are implemented by dominant firms. In fact, the 
EU Competition Law doesn t consider per se illegal the existence of a dominant position, especially 
if it is obtained thanks to a competition based on the merits. But the dominant firms, because of 
their large market power, must have a particular responsibility in the adoption of their conducts. 
This explains why some practices which are perfectly allowed to a small firm could be prohibited to 
a dominant firm.  
The most important problem about the abuse of dominance in the innovative industries 
concerns the definition of the relevant market and consequently the determination of the market 
shares held by a given undertaking. In fact, high-technology industries present two particular 
features, which can raise some doubts about the utility of the traditional approach. Firstly, the 
boundaries of the market cannot be easily defined, because the market is subject to a continuous 
evolution, given the introduction of new products or the quality improvements for the existing 
products. Secondly, the type of competition which is relevant in these industries is the competition 
for the market, rather than the competition in the market. In fact, several firms may be interested in 
entering a given market and then they compete in order to invent a new product, more advanced 
than the previous one, which can better satisfy the demand from the consumers. But once that the 
firm has won this competition in order to get the market demand, it becomes the market leader and 
then it acquires a monopolistic position. In this case, there cannot be a competition in the market, 
based on different prices, simply because in this Schumpeterian setting only one firm owns the 
advanced technology and all the customers are interested in the new version of the product. Of 
                                                
4 The abuse of dominant position in the EU Competition Law corresponds to the notion of monopolization 
regulated in Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
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course, this doesn t mean that there is not competition in such market, given that many firms can 
potentially enter the market and then challenge the dominant position of the incumbent. As a 
consequence of that, the competition for the market is the type of competition that must be pursued 
as an objective in high-technology industries. 
Moreover, the abuse of dominant position in the EU Competition Law has been recently 
object of a broad discussion, promoted by the European Commission in order to revise the 
application of art.82 to the exclusionary practices in the perspective of an economic approach. Such 
approach focuses on the objective of improving consumer welfare5, as stressed in the Report of the 
Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy6: in so doing, it avoids confusing the protection 
of competition with the protection of competitors and it stresses that the ultimate yardstick of 
competition policy is in the satisfaction of consumer needs.
 As it is also explained in this report, an economics-based approach to the application of 
article 82 implies that the assessment of each specific case will not be undertaken on the basis of the 
form that a particular business practice takes (for example, exclusive dealing, tying, etc.) but rather 
will be based on the assessment of the anti-competitive effects generated by business behaviour. 
This implies that competition authorities will need to identify a competitive harm, and assess the 
extent to which such a negative effect on consumers is potentially outweighed by efficiency gains. 
Another important consequence of this approach is in terms of procedure: the economic 
approach implies that there is no need to establish a preliminary and separate assessment of 
dominance. Rather, the emphasis is on the establishment of a verifiable and consistent account of 
significant competitive harm, since the anti-competitive effect is what really matters and is already 
proof of dominance. This approach has also natural implications in terms of the burden of proof in 
specific cases. Competition authorities have to show the presence of significant anti-competitive 
harm, while the dominant firm should bear the burden of establishing credible efficiency arguments.     
                                                
5 In general, the main objective of the antitrust policy should be the maximization of the consumers welfare, 
within a competitive market structure, rather than the protection of the business interests of the single firms against the 
abusive conduct of a leader or the collusive effect of a cartel. In practice, we have often observed the opposite in the 
implementation of the EU Antitrust Policy, as many economists have correctly argued. And even if the two objectives 
are not conflicting each other, the pursuit of one objective doesn t necessarily imply the satisfaction of the other one. On 
this issue see for instance Etro F. (2007), Competition, Innovation and Antitrust, Springer - Verlag 
6 Gual J., Hellwig M., Perrot A., Polo M., Rey P., Schmidt K. and Stenbacka R. (2005), An Economic 
Approach to Art.82, Report by the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy 
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2.1 The Abuse of Dominance and the Refusal to Supply in the EU Antitrust Policy
 
In general, the refusal to supply the information protected by intellectual property cannot be 
considered per se as an abusive conduct, even for a dominant undertaking, simply because the 
exclusion of the other agents from the exploitation of a given facility is a typical prerogative of the 
owner of any property right, whatever is the object of this legal protection, a physical good or an 
intellectual idea. Moreover, the introduction of an economic approach in the interpretation of the 
antitrust discipline in the last few years has excluded the application of per se rules and has required 
a specific demonstration of the damage produced for effective competition in the market and 
especially of the loss generated in terms of consumers welfare. And in fact, according to the case 
law developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union on this issue, such refutation may be 
considered as an anti-competitive behaviour only if some conditions are satisfied: if the requested 
intellectual property is indispensable for the other firms to compete; if the refusal to deal causes the 
complete foreclosure of the market; if the refusal prevents the emergence of markets for new 
products for which there is substantial demand; and if the refusal is not objectively justified7. In 
such situations, defined as exceptional circumstances , such conduct of a dominant firm, holder of 
the intellectual property right, is supposed to have an exclusionary purpose and then it is considered 
as an abuse of dominance.  
A central issue, in the application of these conditions, is the so called new product test. In 
fact, in order to establish a duty to license intellectual property, the Commission must verify that the 
product to be developed is effectively a new kind of product, and not simply a quality improvement 
of an existing type of product. This requirement is consistent with the view that a refusal to supply 
is unlawful if it produces a prejudice to consumers: vice versa, if consumers receive a market option 
that didn t exist previously and for which there is demand, there is a clear benefit to consumer 
welfare. In particular, a new product is one which satisfies potential demand by meeting the needs 
of consumers in ways that existing products don t do. So the new product enlarges the set of choices 
available to consumers and expands the market by bringing in consumers who were not satisfied 
before. Of course, the application of this criterion implies several concrete problems: while in some 
cases the novelty of a given product is evident, in many other situations different degrees of novelty 
                                                
7 Initially, these conditions were determined in several antitrust cases concerning the refusal to supply physical 
facilities, such as the infrastructures of a port. More recently, they were established also for the refusal to supply 
intellectual property, such as the information regarding the TV programs broadcasted by different TV companies. In 
particular, these circumstances were held by the European Court of Justice in the decision on the case Magill, 
concerning the refusal by some Irish TV companies to license the program listings to Magill, the compiler of a 
comprehensive weekly TV guide. In that case, such refusal was judged as an abusive conduct under art.82 and then the 
Court stated an order for a compulsory license of the listings material from the TV companies, in order to allow Magill 
to produce its guide.  
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can be distinguished. Moreover, another disputable profile of this test is the identification of the 
substantial demand, given that it is difficult to analyze the demand for a product that still doesn t 
exist. Anyway, the need to check the existence of this potential demand requires that the 
development of the product is in a quite advanced stage, such that the information protected by the 
intellectual property is essential to complete the design of such product.     
2.2 A Competition Policy for Intellectual Property Rights?
An important issue, also discussed in policy debates, is whether antitrust intervention should 
differ in the cases involving intellectual property rights, for example through the introduction of 
some specific exemptions in the implementation of competition law. In fact, both in the EU and in 
the US, for the purpose of antitrust policy, intellectual property is considered as comparable to 
physical property, so it doesn t receive a stronger protection. Nevertheless, intellectual property 
presents some specific characteristics, because of its role in promoting research and development: 
indeed, legal protection enhances market power of right-holders, such that they can raise prices 
above marginal costs; but, at the same time, it gives to innovators the possibility to profit from the 
fruits of their efforts. Then, once that the two countervailing arguments are compared, it can be 
argued that, from the consumers point of view, some market power in the supply of goods or 
services can be an acceptable price to pay for the creation of new or improved goods or services. 
So, the current view in antitrust policy is that the owners of intellectual property rights are 
entitled to profit from the exclusionary power of their rights, but they can do it without creating 
other restraints on competition. This implies, in practice, a distinction between a primary market 
and a secondary market (or after market). Let define as primary the market of the specific product 
for which the intellectual property is granted: in this market the IP owner can fully exercise his right 
and then can exclude other agents from the exploitation of the protected content. In this case, the 
dominant position of the IP holder is also compatible with the antitrust law, given that it represents 
the outcome of a competition based on the merits: in fact the IP owner has gained a monopolistic 
market power thanks to the introduction of some fundamental innovations which are demanded and 
appreciated by the consumers. Moreover, let consider as secondary the market for a different 
product, which is however dependent on the product in the primary market: in this context the IP 
holder cannot exclusively exploit the intellectual property right, and especially cannot use it in such 
a way to leverage its monopoly power in the primary market to acquire a dominant position in the 
secondary market. In fact, that dominance in the aftermarket would not be determined by a 
competition on the merits, but by an abuse in the exercise of an IP right granted for a different 
market. 
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So, on the basis of this distinction, used both by the European Court of Justice8 and by the 
US Jurisprudence on essential facilities, we can argue that the refusal to supply intellectual property 
to a competitor operating in the same (primary) market cannot be defined as an abuse, while the 
same refusal to an undertaking in another (secondary) market can be considered as an antitrust 
violation to the extent that it can be proven to stifle competition in after markets. 
This distinctive criterion has been adopted as a compromise solution between different 
interests: on one hand, the idea of protecting intellectual property at least in the specific market of 
the product for which the IP right has been granted; on the other hand, the intent to avoid 
unreasonable exclusionary effect due to the exercise of an IP right in markets for different products. 
Nevertheless, this distinction can be and in fact has been - criticized for several reasons. Firstly, 
because it is difficult to define the boundaries between the primary market and the secondary 
market, especially when the new product that another firm wants to develop is however very similar 
to the product which incorporates the innovation protected by a patent. Secondly, because it cannot 
be excluded that the intellectual property content supplied to a competitor in the secondary market 
can be exploited by the same firm in order to enter the primary market. In particular, this latter issue 
cannot be ruled out even when the new product supplied by the licensee firm in the secondary 
market is clearly different from the one sold by the IP holder in the primary market. We consider a 
clear example of this problem right in the Microsoft Europe case: in fact, in that situation, the firm 
interested in the interoperability information in order to develop a compatible server operating 
system was also a possible entrant in the market for PC operating systems. In these cases, even if 
the disclosed information are not immediately usable in order to build up a new product for the 
primary market, the supply of intellectual property by the right-holder may certainly incentivize the 
imitation process by the licensee firm. Then, in presence of these concerns, we can wonder whether 
it is worth to establish a compulsory licensing of the IP right even for the secondary market. 
So, the final issue is whether an effective protection of intellectual property rights, also for 
innovation-enhancing purposes, can eventually require a specific antitrust discipline, also implying 
some exceptions to the application of the competition law. At present, some exemptions are 
admitted by the EU Antitrust Law only for the collusive agreements: in fact, art.81 par.3 of the EU 
Treaty provides a specific exemption for the agreements and concerted practices which contribute 
to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
                                                
8 Let consider for example the decision in the case Magill: there the primary market was the one of TV 
broadcasting, while the secondary market was the one of guides for television programs. The refusal to supply the 
information, required by Magill in order to compile television program listings, was judged by the European Court of 
Justice as an abusive conduct, because it had foreclosure effects on a secondary downstream market, different from the 
primary market where instead the TV Companies were entitled to freely exercise their copyright.    
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benefit. On the basis of these Treaty provisions, some regulations have been adopted for the 
agreements concerning technological transfer. On the contrary, no exemption is admitted for the 
general rule on abuse of dominance, under art. 82 TEC: then a dominant firm, holder of an 
intellectual property right, has to pay particular attention to its conducts, because each exclusionary 
practice in a secondary market, if not supported by an objective justification, can be considered as 
an abuse of dominance, also in the exercise of an intellectual property right.   
3. The Antitrust Microsoft Europe Case 
After discussing the main principles governing the refusal to supply intellectual property 
within the EU Antitrust Policy, we want to focus on the Microsoft Europe Case, as decided by the 
European Commission in 2004. In particular, we analyze the implementation of the EU antitrust 
rules to the case and we propose a dynamic leverage theory in order to describe the strategic 
behaviour of this corporation within the software market. More specifically, this explanation will 
point out the endogenous dynamics of such market and then will draw attention to the Microsoft s 
attempt to influence the market structure, in such a way to defend its dominant position in the 
market of PC operating systems, against possible threats for the future.  
But, in order to understand the complexity of the Microsoft Europe Case, it is worth to 
briefly recall some facts about the various antitrust cases regarding this corporation both in the EU 
and in the US, as well as to explain some features about the structure of the relevant markets in the 
case we are considering.   
3.1 Some Facts about the Microsoft Antitrust Cases in the US and in the EU
Microsoft Corporation, known as the producer of Windows, the most widely used operating 
system for personal computers, has been the object of several antitrust procedures both in Europe 
and in the US, because of its very large near monopolistic market share, and specifically for its 
monopolistic business practices towards consumers and its discriminatory strategies against 
competitors. For our purposes, the study of the Microsoft antitrust cases is interesting because many 
of these controversies involved issues about intellectual property protection in the software market: 
in particular, whether a given exclusionary conduct adopted by such a dominant firm can be 
considered simply as a way to exercise an intellectual property right or better as an abuse of 
dominance and under which conditions such undertaking can be obliged to license to the 
competitors some protocols protected by intellectual property. 
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The first Microsoft case in antitrust policy was started by the US Department of Justice in 
1998, after several complaints regarding alleged antitrust violations by Microsoft in the PC 
operating systems market and in the browsers market9. In particular, the following points were 
raised: first, the maintenance of monopolization in the market of Intel-compatible PC operating 
systems, through various anti-competitive conducts, like exclusionary provisions in licensing 
agreements with original equipment manufacturers, as well as exclusive dealings with internet 
access providers; secondly, the tying of the Windows operating system with Internet Explorer, 
which had a foreclosing effect towards the other competitors in the browsers market, in particular 
Netscape Navigator.  
In Europe, the first antitrust case against Microsoft (known as Microsoft Europe ) was 
promoted by the European Commission, which adopted an infringement decision in March 2004  
for abuse of a dominant position (art.82 TEC) and imposed the largest fine ever in European 
competition policy,  497 million. The decision stated that Microsoft had abused its dominant 
position in the PC operating systems market in two ways: by deliberately restricting inter-
operability between PC Windows and non Microsoft work group server operating systems; and by 
tying Windows Media Player with Windows operating system. This decision by the European 
Commission was later confirmed by the Court of First Instance in September 2007, following an 
appeal lodged by Microsoft. 
In January 2009, another Microsoft case was started by the European Commission, 
regarding the tying of Internet Explorer with Windows, framed in terms very similar to the previous 
US case. According to the Commission s Statement of Objections, Microsoft may have infringed 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty by abusing its dominant position in the market for client PC operating 
systems through the tying of Explorer: indeed this conduct, by making Microsoft's web browser 
available on more than 90% of the PCs worldwide, would distort competition on the merits between 
competing web browsers, by providing Internet Explorer with an artificial distribution advantage 
which other web browsers are unable to match.  
                                                
9 For an analysis of the US Microsoft case, see Evans D. S., Nichols A. L. and Schmalensee R. (2001), An 
Analysis of the Government s Economic Case in U.S. versus Microsoft, Antitrust Bulletin; see also Fisher F. M. and 
Rubinfeld D. L. (2000), United States versus Microsoft: An Economic Analysis, in Evans D.S., Fisher F. M., Rubinfeld 
D. M. and Schmalensee R. (2000), Did Microsoft Harm Consumers? Two Opposite Views, AEI Brooking Center for 
Regulatory Studies  
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3.2 The Analysis of the Relevant Markets in the Microsoft Europe Case
 
In the analysis of the Microsoft Europe Case, we will focus on one of the two aspects 
examined by the European Commission in its decision, that is the refusal to supply inter-operability 
information regarding Windows PC operating system to other producers of work group server 
operating systems, such as Sun Microsystems. We are interested in examining the inter-operability 
issue rather than the tying of Media Player, because the analysis of this particular conduct allows us 
to study a peculiar aspect of the anti-competitive strategy followed by Microsoft in the last few 
years: it tends to monopolize other adjacent markets for two simultaneous reasons, not only for the 
gain arising from extending its market power to another complementary product, but especially for 
defending, in a forward-looking perspective, its monopoly in PC operating systems against potential 
competition in that market.  
In order to explore the coexistence of these two incentives in Microsoft s conduct and for 
understanding the framework of the case, it is necessary first to analyze the structure of the relevant 
market. Two are the relevant markets considered in this case. 
The first one is that of PC operating system software10, so let us specify what it really 
means. In the text of the decision, the operating systems were defined as system software products 
that control the basic functions of a computer and enable the user to make use of such a computer 
and run application software on it . In the analysis of demand-side substitutability, the European 
Commission mentioned also the distinction between client PC operating systems for Intel-
Compatible and for non Intel-Compatible PCs (for example, Apple Macintosh), given that a client 
PC operating system designed to run on an Intel-compatible PC cannot run on a non Intel-
Compatible PC unless it is modified and vice versa. But, differently from the US Department of 
Justice11, the EU Commission left open the question whether the relevant market for Microsoft 
included only OS for Intel-Compatible PCs, given that the answer didn t really influence the 
outcome of the assessment of its market power. 
Indeed, in the discussion of supply-side substitutability, the Commission pointed out that the 
production of a PC operating system presents increasing returns to scale, given that almost all the 
                                                
10 Some interesting insights on the specific issues of software market are discussed in Katz M. L. and Shapiro 
C. (1998), Antitrust in Software Markets, in Eisenach J. A. and Lenard T. M. (edited by) (1998), Competition, 
Innovation and the Microsoft Monopoly: Antitrust in the Digital Marketplace, Kluwer Academic Publishers  
11 The US Department of Justice limited the definition of the relevant market to the OS for Intel-Compatible 
PCs on the basis of a demand substitutability consideration. As suggested by the results of the SSNIP test (Small but 
Significant Non-transitory Increase in Prices), a price increase of Windows would not significantly induce consumers to 
switch to MAC OS, because of the costs of acquiring new hardware and compatible software applications, as well as for 
the effort to learn the new system. 
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costs for producing such software are fixed costs due to the development of an initial or new 
version of it. Then, while these fixed costs are very high, once the initial version has been 
developed and tested, the marginal cost of producing an extra copy is very low. Such fixed 
development costs also explain the existence of an important barrier to entry for other firms 
potentially interested in supplying a new operating system.  
In the market for PC operating systems (defined without any distinction for PCs), Microsoft 
had a market share higher than 90%, both in units of product and in revenues, which was persistent 
over time and even increasing in the last few years. Then it had a strongly dominant position in the 
market through its Windows products12, as it was also acknowledged by Microsoft13.  
The second relevant market is that of workgroup server operating systems. In the 
Commission s decision they were defined as operating systems designed and marketed to deliver 
collectively file, print and group and user administration services to relatively small numbers of 
client PCs linked together in a small to medium-sized network . This definition clearly shows the 
importance of interoperability between workgroup servers and personal computers, given that the 
services provided by the first ones are targeted for the second ones. 
Microsoft also supplies workgroup server operating systems, where it faces competition 
from a set of other vendors with their own proprietary technologies. But, at the same time, 
Microsoft s PC operating system near-monopoly gives it control over the proprietary protocol 
specifications that allow a PC to interoperate effectively with a server operating system, then 
building an additional (artificial) barrier to entry. This peculiarity of Microsoft s position also 
explains the rapid rise of its share in this market: indeed, while it had a market share equal to 55.6% 
in unit shipments and to 54.7% in revenues in 2000, just two years after, its market share was equal 
to 66.4% in unit shipments and to 65.7% in revenues. Moreover, it is important to remark that this 
11% increase of Microsoft s market share in workgroup server operating systems from 2000 to 
2002 was contemporaneous to the launch of a new version of Microsoft Windows, that is Windows 
2000. In fact, many of the already limited disclosures that had been undertaken by Microsoft with 
respect to Windows NT have been discontinued with the development of Windows 2000. This 
empirically shows the negative correlation between the level of supply of interoperability 
                                                
12 Usually, market share is one of the elements considered in the assessment of the market power for the 
analysis of a dominant position, together with some other aspects, such as the existence of entry barriers, the technology 
used by the competitors, the degree of excess capacity held by rival firms, the time persistence of a certain pattern. But 
clearly, in this case, the presence of such a high market share was enough for proving the market power of Microsoft, 
which is of course strengthened by other factors.  
13 For completeness, it must be said that in a first stage Microsoft contested the application of the traditional 
approach for market definition and assessment of market power to the new economy s industries, characterized by an 
exponential growth in technology level, able to determine a rapid evolution of market structure. 
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information on Windows PC operating system and the size of Microsoft s market power in the 
workgroup server operating systems. Then it is clear how Microsoft could easily improve this 
market power in the adjacent market, simply by reducing the disclosure of interface protocols on 
Windows PC.   
On the basis of the high market shares, but especially in consideration of the links between 
the PC operating systems market and the workgroup server operating systems market, the European 
Commission concluded that Microsoft had a dominant position also in the market for workgroup 
server operating systems. 
The market structure discussed until now is that one described in the decision of the 
European Commission. But the rapid evolution of the software market is likely to modify very soon 
some of these features, in particular as far it concerns the role of servers in providing services to the 
personal computers14, in such a way to compromise even the function of the PC operating systems. 
Indeed, if the past quarter-century was characterised by a decentralisation of computing, with 
information processing and storage placed on every desktop and laptop, the coming era will bring 
greater consolidation of computing power in clouds , or large-scale, distributed computing 
facilities. The economies of scale arising from consolidating computing in fewer places, and the 
availability of fast internet connections that make it easy to exploit these internet-based resources 
definitely explain this change. The consequence of this evolution is that, for many consumers, it 
will be possible to use these services simply by connecting a simple handheld device or an 
inexpensive laptop to the web, rather than by employing a powerful computer running Microsoft 
Windows or Apple OSX operating systems. In this way, the transformations of the software market 
could significantly reduce the importance and the utility of the PC operating systems.   
4. The Decision of the European Commission in the Microsoft Case
On the basis of the previous description of the concerned markets, it is now possible to 
briefly recall the contents of the decision, in particular as far it regards the remedies imposed for 
Microsoft s conduct15. Indeed, exploiting its dominant position in the PC operating systems market, 
                                                
14 An interesting explanation of these future evolutions is provided in the following article: Financial Times, 
Cloud Control, 26th March 2009. 
15 For a discussion of the Microsoft Europe case, in the general framework of the refusal to deal, as a category 
of the abuse of dominant position, see O Donoghue R., Padilla J. (2006), The Law and Economics of Art.82 EC, Hart 
Publishing, in particular chapter 8. For the problems related to the refusal to license intellectual property in EU 
competition policy, especially in the Microsoft Europe case, see Korah V. (2006), Intellectual Property Rights And the 
EC Competition Rules, Hart Publishing, in particular chapter 8  
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Microsoft had refused to supply the protocol specifications related to the Active Directory in 
Windows, which were requested by competing stand-alone vendors of server operating systems, 
and in particular by Sun Microsystems, or had done so on discriminatory terms. That had produced 
the effect of reducing the interoperability of competitors products with its dominant Windows PC 
operating systems.  
The Commission therefore required, as a remedy, that Microsoft should draw up detailed 
lists of protocol specifications to enable third parties to interconnect with Microsoft Windows client  
and server operating systems. The way the Commission justified a duty to license was the 
following: 
1) Microsoft s conduct was part of a general pattern of conduct, including another abuse (tying of 
Media Player); 
2) Microsoft discriminated by supplying certain vendors but not others; 
3) Microsoft ended past disclosures of interoperability information; 
4) Microsoft s conduct determined a risk of elimination of competition on the server OS because 
interoperability information was of significant competitive importance and there were no 
substitutes for Microsoft s providing this information; 
5) a duty to disclose the specifications did not affect Microsoft s incentives to innovate, since 
source code information would not be disclosed. 
The decision of the European Commission on this case is based on a static analysis of 
Microsoft s conduct in the market for server operating systems, aimed at verifying the gains coming 
for Microsoft from a monopolization of this adjacent market: in particular, we want to emphasize 
the static perspective of that analysis because it assumes the structure of the relevant market as 
given and doesn t consider the possible modifications of the market, due to the innovation process 
or to the conduct of the concerned firms. 
Then, in the decision, the refusal to supply interoperability information to the other 
producers of server operating systems is considered as an exclusionary strategy aimed at foreclosing 
the competitors in that market by leveraging on Microsoft s dominant position in the market for PC 
operating systems. In order to show this argument, the Commission follows a three-step assessment, 
suggested by the economic analysis of leverage16. First, Microsoft had an incentive to expand its 
market power from client PC operating systems market to the adjacent work group server operating 
systems market. Secondly, Microsoft s conduct (i.e. refusal to disclose information on interface) 
was an effective means to eliminate competitors. Thirdly, the elimination of competitors in the 
workgroup server OS market must have been harmful to consumers. 
                                                
16 See Lévêque F. (2005), Innovation, Leveraging and Essential Facilities: Interoperability Licensing in the 
EU Microsoft Case, World Competition, March.   
 15
In our discussion, we will focus on the first of these aspects, that is the issue whether 
Microsoft had an incentive to leverage its dominance from the market for PC operating systems to 
the market for workgroup server operating systems and whether its conduct could be explained by a 
wish to exclude potential entry into the market of operating systems for personal computers.    
5. A Dynamic Leverage Theory for Compatibility Decisions
The approach followed by the Commission in examining the Microsoft case was based on a 
disputable assumption: the absence of threats to Microsoft s monopoly in the operating systems 
(OS) for personal computers. As explained before, with reference to the future evolution of the OS 
market, this view doesn t exactly correspond to the reality. Indeed, the development of new online 
servers, able to process and store information from clients personal computers as well as to provide 
online services and facilities without the intermediation of PC operating systems, can in the future 
increasingly compromise the applications entry barrier that has guaranteed up to now the dominant 
position of Microsoft in PC operating systems market.   
The applications entry barrier is a consequence of the network externalities characterizing 
the software market, which can be explained through a two-way reasoning: consumers are willing 
to buy a given PC operating system as it allows to run several applications and tend to value its 
utility depending on the number of applications developed for it; at the same time, the producers of 
PC software are interested in developing applications for the operating systems which are more 
widespread, in order to exploit the broadest possibilities for diffusion of their own products. In other 
words, the success of a PC operating system strongly depends on the quantity of applications that 
can be runned on it: this is the reason why the number of PC programmes developed for Microsoft 
Windows constitutes an entry barrier in the OS market. Indeed, possible entrants are discouraged 
from entry because, in order to acquire a significant market share, they need to convince software 
developers to produce applications for a new operating system not yet known to consumers. Then, 
if a platform available through a web browser, as Java through Netscape, can implement several 
applications independently from the usage of a specific PC operating system 17 or if an online server 
                                                
17 This is the main issue in the US Microsoft case. In fact, it is often recalled as The war of browsers , 
between Internet Explorer and Netscape Navigator, because through the decision to tie the browser Explorer to the 
operating system Windows, Microsoft managed to strongly reduce the market share of Netscape, initially the leading 
browser. Nevertheless, also in this case, the primary interest of Microsoft was not in browsers market, but in operating 
systems market. In fact, using this exclusionary practice against Netscape, Microsoft managed to limit the diffusion of 
Java, a middleware developed by Sun Microsystems, able to support software applications for multiple operating 
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can process and store information from clients personal computers without the need of a PC 
operating system, this can limit the importance of the applications entry barrier in favour of 
Microsoft in the software market. On the other hand, it can also reduce the size of the market for PC 
operating systems, simply because of the reduction in demand.  
For this reason, a dynamic analysis of the future threats to Microsoft s monopoly in clients 
PC operating systems market can provide a much more satisfactory explanation of Microsoft s 
incentives for expanding its market power to the workgroup server OS market than the static 
perspective which underlies the Commission s decision. Of course, the refusal to supply 
interoperability information to Sun Microsystems can be seen as a part of a general line of conduct 
aimed at decreasing the compatibility between Microsoft Windows and the workgroup server 
operating systems of other producers. However, it must be pointed out that this conduct was a 
means not just for monopolizing another market, but especially for protecting Microsoft s dominant 
position in the PC operating systems market. Indeed, a determinant reason why Microsoft wanted to 
leverage its monopoly position to the workgroup server OS market was to fend off potential 
entrants to the PC operating systems market, i.e. its core market.  
In light of these observations, Microsoft s conduct can be explained on the basis of a 
dynamic leverage theory, elaborated as an extension of the model proposed by Choi and 
Stefanadis18. This is a model developed for analysing tying decisions with complementary products, 
and its purpose is to explain how tying can affect the investment incentives of entrants and buttress 
an incumbent s monopoly position. It offers a theoretical framework that is particularly useful for 
high-technology sectors, given that the potential entrant has to implement a risky R&D investment, 
but can enter the market only if this innovation effort is successful and makes it possible to develop 
a new technology. The probability of success depends also on random factors, but it is anyway an 
increasing function of the level of investments. Once the incumbent decides to tie two 
complementary products, given that it is a monopolist in one of them, the entrant can gain access to 
consumers only if an entrant in the other product is successful, or if it manages to enter both 
                                                                                                                                                                 
systems and then perceived by Microsoft as a threat to Windows as a platform for software development. In particular, 
thanks to an agreement with Netscape, Navigator became the main channel by which the Java runtime environment got 
access to the PC of Windows users. Then the integration of Internet Explorer (completely free) within Windows, even 
without the possibility to remove it, allowed not only to enlarge Microsoft s market share in the browser market, but 
especially to protect the dominant position of Windows in the operating systems market and then to deter entry in that 
one. 
18 Choi J. P. and Stefanadis C. (2001), Tying, Investment and the Dynamic Leverage Theory, The RAND 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No.1, pp.52-71 
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markets at the same time19. In this way, tying makes the success of investment less certain, 
decreasing the entrants incentive for investment and innovation. 
In many cases of compatibility between complementary products, such as in the Microsoft 
case, the decision to deny interoperability can produce the exclusionary effect on the producer of 
one of the products in the same way as in tying models. To see this, let us consider a case where an 
incumbent operates in two markets, A and B, being monopolist in A and competing with other 
firms in B. As in the model we presented above, the incumbent firm, by refusing interoperability 
between A and competing versions of B, the incumbent can leverage its monopoly position to the 
market for B in order to foreclose rivals. But it can also fend off potential entrants into its own 
market. Consumers who need both complementary products the joint users are induced to buy 
the version of B that is produced by the incumbent, since this is the only version compatible with A, 
which they also need in order to build up a system20. In this way, a linkage is created between A and 
the incumbent s version of B, which may be even stronger than in a tying case and, by way of 
consequence, more effective in foreclosing competitors. The exclusionary mechanism therefore is 
almost the same, especially if we consider as a term of comparison a tying decision with high 
commitment level, which creates a stable connection between two products.    
5.1 The Case of Two Independent Firms
On the basis of the above observations, it is now possible to present the framework of a 
model. We will firstly analyze the basic model21, with two independent firms, and then its extension 
to the case of an integrated entrant.  
Let us consider 2 complementary products: A and B. Firm 1 is present in both products. It 
produces A1 and B1 at unit cost ch each. In each of the two markets, there is a potential entrant that 
can sell products A2 and B2 (substitutes for A1 and B1). By making an investment in R&D in the 
amount of  Ii2, each potential entrant obtains, with probability 22 ii IIp (with 2iI ) 22, a 
                                                
19 In the first case there are two independent firms, each of them interested in the market for one product; in 
the second case there is an integrated entrant, interested in both markets. As it will be clear from the following 
discussion, the second hypothesis can be more relevant from our point of view, for an application to Microsoft Europe 
case. 
20 Clearly, those who are interested only in B can buy it from the competitors, while those who need only A 
have to buy it necessarily from the incumbent. 
21 In the analysis of the standard case, with two independent firms, we will follow the variant of Choi and 
Stefanadis (2001) which is presented in Motta M. (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge 
University Press 
22 We assume that the probability of success depends more on the investment level than on random factors. 
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successful innovation (implying unit cost reduction from ch to cl). The cost of investment Ii2 is equal 
to: 2222 ii IIC   where lh cc
We assume that the utility function of consumers is given by:  AjBjBjAj ppU , 
Then the game is organized as follows: 
1) Firm 1 decides on compatibility between A and B 
2) Firms A2 and B2 take investment decisions 
3) Active firms name price in a Bertrand competition. 
Let us solve the game backwards.   
Price Sub-Game 
In the case of no compatibility, an entrant can operate in the market only if another entrant is 
successful, otherwise only the incumbent is active.  
a) If only the incumbent is active, it sets a price  and then it earns hc2
b) If both entrants are active, each sets a price hc and then makes profits lh cc
 
In the case of interoperability, a successful entrant in only one product can market it, then 3 
situations can be considered. 
a) If only the incumbent is active, it sets a price  and then it earns hc2
b) If both entrants are active, each sets a price hc and so makes profits lh cc
c) If only one entrant is active, there is a continuum of equilibria. The incumbent obtains a share  
of the innovation rent, with 1,0 , so its profits are lhh ccc2 , while the entrant gets 
lh cc1 .  
Investment Sub-Game 
Under compatibility, the profits by an entrant are: 
222222 11 ilhkilhkii ICccIpIpccIpIp
where the first term indicates the profits obtained when the other entrant is not successful, while the 
second term presents the profits gained when both the entrants are successful. 
Substituting the functions for p(Ii2) and p(Ik2), as well as for C(Ii2), firm 2 maximizes the 
profit function with respect to Ii2. From the FOC, given that at the symmetric equilibrium 
*
2
*
2
*
2 III BA , the optimal investment is: 
lh
lh
cc
ccI 11*2 
Under no compatibility, the profits by an entrant are: 
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~~~
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ilhkii ICccIpIp
At the symmetric equilibrium, the optimal investment is: 
lh
lh
cc
ccI *2
~             
A comparison between the optimal levels of investment in the two cases shows that 
*
2
*
2
~II only when =1. Otherwise, if <1, given that 0*2I , this implies that 
*
2
*
2
~II . The optimal investment level under compatibility is equal to the one under no 
compatibility only when the incumbent gets all the innovation rent; then the entrant, since it doesn t 
get any profit, is induced to invest less. On the contrary, when the incumbent obtains only part of 
the innovation rent, the entrant has positive profit and then it is willing to invest more.   
Interoperability Decisions 
Under compatibility, firm 1 s expected profits are: 
lhh ccIIcI
*
2
*
2
2*
2
*
1 1221 
where the first term presents the profits that the incumbent obtains if it is the only firm active in 
both markets, while the second term indicates the part of the profits that firm 1 can obtain by 
extracting part of the innovation rent when one of the entrants is successful.  
Under no compatibility, firm 1 s expected profits are: 
hcI 2
~1~
2
*
2
*
1
 
In order to decide whether to allow for inter-operability, the incumbent has to compare the 
expected profit in the two cases. The expected level of profits under compatibility depends on the 
value of  , both directly through the second term, and indirectly through the value of *2I .  
In particular, when =0, no interoperability is preferred as  
given that ** I~I 22 0 . Since each entrant can obtain the entire innovation rent, it is willing to invest 
a lot in R&D, then increasing its probability of success and decreasing the expected profit level of 
the incumbent. 
On the contrary, when =1, interoperability is profitable because  
given that:                . Since the incumbent can fully exercise a price squeeze thanks to its monopoly 
on one market and then profit from the increasing demand due to the complementary product, it is 
interested in allowing for compatibility.   
hh cIcI 2
~10~201 *2
*
1
2*
2
*
1
hlhh cIccIIcI 2
~11~~1~22~11
2
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
2
2
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
2
~1 II
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So, in conclusion, there exists a value 1,0 such that *1
*
1
~ for  . It 
means that over (under) this threshold for  interoperability is (is not) the profit-maximizing 
strategy for the incumbent. Then, in principle, we cannot say that the incumbent has always an 
incentive in denying inter-operability to the entrants. In fact, we can identify a trade-off for the 
incumbent in these decisions: 
a)  no compatibility decreases the risk of entry, then increasing its profits (exclusion effect); 
b) no compatibility reduces the profit of the incumbent in presence of only one entrant (price 
squeeze effect).  
Depending on which effect prevails, the incumbent determines the optimal interoperability 
strategy. But, in order to take this decision, it has to know before what price squeeze it can exercise 
on its product. If it is low, the incumbent would find optimal to deny interoperability. For instance, 
if there is not perfect complementarity between the two products, and then if some consumers are 
interested only in one of them, the increase of the demand for the entrant can only partially benefit 
the incumbent: indeed, if one entrant is active, the incumbent is able to obtain only a share (1- )  
of the innovation rent, where  is the fraction of the consumers interested only in the product sold 
by the entrant. 
This observation can be useful in order to explain Microsoft s conduct, when we consider 
the structure of the relevant markets in this case. In fact, PC operating systems and server operating 
systems are complements for some consumers and substitutes for other ones. 
They are complements because the value for customers of a server operating system 
increases when the quality of the PC operating system increases, and then also when the 
compatibility between the two operating systems is higher. Such complementarity is, however, not 
relevant for all consumers because some of them never connect their personal computer to a 
workgroup server, and also because some buyers of server operating systems are not interested in 
purchasing new versions of a PC operating system. 
Moreover, operating systems for personal computers and servers are also substitutes for 
some customers because there are functions that can be integrated either into the client PC operating 
system or into the server operating system. In fact, at present personal computers are generally 
equipped on a stand-alone basis; but, as already discussed, the future evolution in the software 
market, characterized by the development of the cloud systems, can imply the diffusion of a more 
server-centric approach where desktop may mainly be a screen. 
So, since only some consumers are interested in both products while some other ones are 
interested just in one of them, there exists just a partial complementarity between the two operating 
systems. This has an important implication for the discussed model: if among all the buyers of 
workgroup server operating systems, the fraction of the consumers interested only in the latter ones 
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were to be quite substantial, this would significantly reduce the possibility for Microsoft to get a 
share of the innovation rents from the entrant and would reduce the profitability of the compatibility 
decision. Moreover, given that now workgroup servers can release an increasing number of services 
directly to personal computers without the intermediation of a PC operating system, the fraction of 
customers only interested in server operating systems is expected to increase in the future and then 
this further reduces the profitability of a compatibility decision in Microsoft s perspective.  
This remark could also explain a given change in Microsoft s interoperability strategy: 
indeed, for an initial period of time, it had been supplying the interface information and only in a 
second period it had decided to interrupt the disclosure of these protocols. So, from this point of 
view, the abusive conduct of Microsoft can be better qualified, rather than as a refusal to provide 
interoperability, as a disruption of the previous provision of interface information to the competitors 
in a secondary market. We emphasize this point because the theory that we have just discussed 
could someway motivate this change in Microsoft s interoperability strategy, without using the 
leverage argument proposed by the Commission. 
In fact, given that the product relationship between PC operating systems and server 
operating systems, initially defined in terms of complementarity, is evolving in the next few years 
towards an increasing degree of substitutability, this would justify the decreasing profitability of a 
compatibility decision. So, following this argument, the refusal to continue to license these 
protocols to the other producers of server operating systems would be determined by an ex-ante 
evaluation of the non-profitability of an interoperability decision, rather than by the intention of 
monopolizing the adjacent market through a leveraging conduct. In fact, in the framework of the 
model, the interoperability decision is a function of the profit value that a firm can obtain under 
different setups: then we can interpret the disruption decision taken by Microsoft as if in period 1, 
with high complementarity of the two products, interoperability was the most profitable decision, 
while in period 2, with low complementarity of the two operating systems, no compatibility was the 
profit-maximizing strategy. Of course, in order to exhaustively show this argument, we should 
calibrate the model: then we ought to know the exact values of the parameters  and , but in 
particular we should compute, on the basis of market analyses, how the value of  (the fraction of 
customers only interested in server operating systems) changes over time, depending on the 
evolution of the software market and on the preferences of consumers.      
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5.2 The Case of One Integrated Entrant
After analyzing the case of two independent firms as entrants, we can now examine the 
extension of the model to the case of one integrated entrant23, which can be more useful in order to 
explain the issue of interoperability decisions in the Microsoft Europe case. Indeed, from the 
viewpoint of Microsoft, as clarified in the defence behind the European Commission, the decision 
to deny compatibility was also justified by the fear that Sun Microsystem could use the required 
information in order to develop new products useful for entering the PC operating systems market. 
In fact, even if the request of disclosure didn t concern the source code of Windows, Sun 
Microsystem, as it was the developer of a middleware platform such as Java, could become in the 
future a potential competitor for Windows in the PC operating systems market24. Moreover, it is 
important to remember that, before that request from Sun Microsystems, and for previous versions 
of Windows, Microsoft had already disclosed this type of interface information, for example 
through a previous license of information to AT&T. This would confirm that the refusal to supply 
the specifications of the protocols to Sun Microsystems was also due to the potential threat it could 
pose to Windows monopoly in the PC operating systems market.  
For this reason the idea of an integrated entrant can be appropriate to describe the role of 
Sun Microsystem in this game, given that it is at the same time the requester of the information 
disclosure for the development of a compatible workgroup server operating system, but also a 
potential competitor for Microsoft in the PC operating systems market. 
In this version, the model follows the same sequence of the game and then is solved 
backward. For the price subgame, we refer to the standard version of the model, with the only 
difference that this time A2 and B2 are an integrated firm: so, when the investment of the entrant is 
successful in both products A2 and B2, this implies that firm 2 is active in both markets; while, 
when the investment is successful only in one of the products, then firm 2 is active only in that 
market. So let consider the optimal investment by the entrant and finally the interoperability 
decisions by the incumbent.  
Investment Sub-Game 
Under compatibility, the profits by the integrated entrant are: 
222222222 2111 kilhkilhikkii ICICccIpIpccIpIpIpIp
                                                
23 The case of an integrated entrant is also presented in the paper by Choi and Stefanadis (2001). But their 
theoretical framework presents the probability of success from investment in R&D in an implicit functional form. In our 
derivation, in order to derive explicit results for the optimal level of investment, we assume as before a linear functional 
form for this probability function. 
24
 In this perspective, the Microsoft Europe case presents many similarities to the US Microsoft case. 
 23
where the first term indicates the profits obtained when the R&D investments of the entrant are 
successful only in one product, while the second term shows the profits gained when the integrated 
firm manages to enter both markets. Firm 2 maximizes the profit function with respect to Ii2 and Ik2. 
From the FOC, given that at the symmetric equilibrium *2
*
2
*
2 III BA , the optimal 
investment is: 
lh
lh
cc
ccI
2
211*
2 
Under no compatibility, the profits by the entrant are: 
22222
~~~~2~ kilhkii ICICccIpIp
where the first term indicates the profits obtained when the integrated firm manages to enter both 
markets (because of the denied interoperability, this is the only case where it can get a profit). 
At the symmetric equilibrium, the optimal investment is: 
lh
lh
cc
ccI
2
2~*
2
            
As before, a comparison between the optimal levels of investment in the two cases shows 
that *2
*
2
~II only when =1. Otherwise, if <1, given that 0*2I , this implies that 
*
2
*
2
~II . The optimal investment level under compatibility is equal to the one under no 
compatibility only when the incumbent gets all the innovation rent; then the entrant, since it doesn t 
get any profit, is induced to invest less. On the contrary, when the incumbent obtains only part of 
the innovation rent, the entrant has positive profit and then it is willing to invest more.  
Interoperability Decisions 
From the viewpoint of the incumbent, the case of one integrated entrant doesn t present any 
significant change in the expected profit function. Nevertheless, the interpretation of the equations 
is slightly different because of the existence of the same potential competitor in both markets. 
Under compatibility, firm 1 s expected profits are: 
lhh ccIIcI
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*
2
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*
1 1221 
where the first term indicates shows the profits that the incumbent gets when it is the only firm 
active in both markets, while the second term indicates the part of the profits that firm 1 can obtain 
by extracting part of the innovation rent when the entrant is successful just in one market.  
Under no compatibility, firm 1 s expected profits are: 
hcI 2
~1~
2*
2
*
1
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which indicates the profits gained when the entrant, because of no interoperability, doesn t manage 
to enter any of the two markets. 
In order to decide whether to allow for inter-operability, the incumbent has to compare the 
expected profit in the two cases. The expected level of profits under compatibility depends on the 
value of  , that is the share of the innovation rent that it can appropriate through the price squeeze 
on the monopolized product.  
So, the conclusions obtained for the case with two independent entrants can apply also in 
this framework. In particular, there exists a value 1,0 such that *1
*
1
~ for  . It 
means that over (under) this threshold interoperability is (is not) the profit-maximizing strategy for 
the incumbent.     
What are the implications of this extension of the model for the analysis of the Microsoft 
Europe case? The main contribution consists in understanding the incentives that can influence the 
interoperability strategy of an incumbent firm, such as Microsoft, monopolist in market A and 
competing with other firms in market B, in the case that its monopoly in market A is under threat. 
In particular, for the purpose of the model, this threat has to come from a firm investing or operating 
in market B, which could be the case with Sun Microsystems. Indeed, the latter is a producer of 
work group server operating systems (product B), but it could be interested in entering in the future 
the market for PC operating systems (product A), also by using the know-how and the technologies 
already acquired through previous R&D investments in software market (think, for example, of the 
technologies employed for developing middleware platforms such as Java).   
As the model shows, the incumbent could be interested in allowing compatibility of its 
product A with competing versions of B, in so far as it can increase its profit by getting a share of 
the innovation rent, when the entrant is active only in market B. In particular, we want to stress the 
importance of the last condition: the incumbent can exercise a price squeeze on product A, 
exploiting the increasing demand due to the complementary product B, provided that it keeps the 
monopoly on A. Indeed, if firm 2 were to be successful in both markets A and B, it would capture 
the entire demand for both products and then firm 1 would not obtain any profit at all. So, from the 
viewpoint of firm 1, the decision to grant interoperability depends not only on the obtainable share 
of the innovation rent, but also on the probability of success of the integrated firm 2 in market A. 
This implies that the incumbent would not find it profitable to allow compatibility not only when 
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the price squeeze margin is too low ( ), but also when the entrant has a high probability of 
success in market A (as exogenously determined by a high ) 25. 
Consequently, when firm 1 is worried about a possible entry of firm 2 in market A, it will 
prefer to deny interoperability, because in this way it can also reduce, even indirectly, the incentives 
of firm 2 for R&D investments in market A. Indeed, as we saw in the investment subgame, for any 
value of  such that <1, the optimal investment under incompatibility is in any case smaller than 
the optimal investment under interoperability. This is because the integrated entrant knows that, in 
the case of no interoperability, it will obtain a profit only if it is successful in both markets, and 
obviously entering two markets is more difficult than succeeding in one of them: the joint 
probability p(IA2) p(IB2) is always lower than the single probability p(IB2), unless p(IA2)=1  (clearly, 
if this was the case, it would no doubt enter market A). Then, given that in the time sequence of the 
game the interoperability decision comes before the investment choice, the incumbent, by refusing 
compatibility, could induce a reduction in the investment level of the integrated entrant and, as a 
result, also decrease the probability of its success in market A 26.             
The conclusions drawn from the model can easily be used to explain the present antitrust 
case: a typical feature of Microsoft s conduct, as also emerged in the US Microsoft case, is the 
propensity to implement discriminatory practices towards competitors as a defence against potential 
entry. Consequently, when it perceived a threat to its monopoly in the PC operating systems, and 
evaluated it as concrete 27 because of a significant probability of success for the investments by the 
potential competitors, the profit-maximizing choice for Microsoft was to deny interoperability, in 
order to avoid that firms operating in the server operating systems market could in the future enter 
the market for PC operating systems. In other words, between the two alternatives of either granting 
compatibility and sharing the innovation rent of the entrant (but with a higher risk for its monopoly 
                                                
25 If  was defined as a random variable, firm A would need to know the expected value of  in order to 
evaluate the exogenous determinants of this probability p(IA2). But even if it was a constant, different for each entrant, 
the incumbent could have an asymmetric information problem, because it could find it difficult to evaluate the quality 
and the effectiveness of the research activity by the entrant, in terms of potential innovation outcomes, also because of 
the secrecy on its results. This information asymmetry could determine an overvaluation of this probability of success, 
then inducing the incumbent to deny interoperability just to defend its monopoly in A against eventual threats, even 
when the share of innovation rent obtainable under compatibility is quite high.  
            
26 Clearly, this doesn t mean that denying interoperability is enough for avoiding that firm 2 can implement 
successful innovations and then enter market A. 
          
27 This model doesn t include information problem in the analysis of the game. But, as suggested in note 25, the 
evaluation of the probability of success, at least for its exogenous component , can play a key role in the 
interoperability decision and then a further extension of the model could also introduce imperfect information, in order 
to study this type of interaction in a more realistic way.   
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in PC operating systems), or refusing interoperability and foreclosing its competitors in both 
markets (but at the cost of renouncing to the additional profits due to the demand for the 
complementary product), Microsoft chose the second option. It adopted this aggressive conduct in 
order to anticipate and prevent the initiatives of possible entrants interested in the PC operating 
systems market: in this sense, the idea to attack competitors instead of waiting to be attacked has 
frequently been implemented by Microsoft as a business strategy over the last few years.   
6. Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the interaction between antitrust policy and intellectual property 
protection, with particular attention to the cases of abuse of dominance regarding refusal to deal, 
when the denied facility is an idea or an invention protected by an IP right. In particular, in this 
framework, the present work has provided an economic analysis of the Microsoft Europe Case, and 
in particular of the part which concerns the refusal to supply the required protocols for the 
interoperability between personal computer operating systems and work group server operating 
systems. In particular, the anti-competitive conduct adopted by Microsoft (as an incumbent 
monopolist in the first market) is examined through a strategic perspective, in order to illustrate the 
incentives for the incumbent to provide or deny compatibility between its own product and 
competing versions of the complementary product. For this purpose, the work extends some 
dynamic interactions, previously considered in tying models, to the issue of interoperability 
between complementary products, in a market characterized by strong network effects, as it is the 
software market. 
The decision of the European Commission in this case represents a very important milestone 
for the solution of refusal to deal issues in a rapidly evolving market, such as the software market: 
by imposing a duty to disclose the interface information related to Windows to Microsoft s 
competitors in the market for workgroup server operating systems, the Commission has implicitly 
considered the interface as an essential facility for the development of that market and has also 
established a duty for the incumbent to make available the interoperability information to its rivals. 
The perspective adopted by the European Commission on this case was an essentially static 
one: it consisted in asking how Microsoft s profits would change if it did or did not engage in the 
exclusionary practices it was accused of, assuming that the rest of the market structure remained the 
same. But, as it results from a dynamic analysis of the concerned markets, the exclusionary practice 
followed by Microsoft had two facets: excluding rivals from the work group server operating 
systems market and defending its core business the market for PC operating systems. A 
consideration on the future evolution of the software market and an evaluation of the entry threat in 
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the PC operating systems market show how the incentive to deter entry in the latter market was in 
fact for Microsoft a determinant reason for denying interoperability, as it can be inferred also from 
some analogies with the features of the exclusionary conduct observed in the US Microsoft Case. 
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